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author | Alex Auvolat <alex@adnab.me> | 2024-02-28 10:51:08 +0100 |
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committer | Alex Auvolat <alex@adnab.me> | 2024-02-28 12:24:21 +0100 |
commit | 90cab5b8f2b5212668975bf445a1e86f638fe1c7 (patch) | |
tree | 9bcc9569e7a8806efdf9d542e37ffa06a7689bca /src/api/signature/payload.rs | |
parent | e9f759d4cb9be28584ab511a0a2dc78b579475c8 (diff) | |
download | garage-90cab5b8f2b5212668975bf445a1e86f638fe1c7.tar.gz garage-90cab5b8f2b5212668975bf445a1e86f638fe1c7.zip |
[fix-presigned] add comments and reorganize
Diffstat (limited to 'src/api/signature/payload.rs')
-rw-r--r-- | src/api/signature/payload.rs | 105 |
1 files changed, 54 insertions, 51 deletions
diff --git a/src/api/signature/payload.rs b/src/api/signature/payload.rs index 435b4206..949da601 100644 --- a/src/api/signature/payload.rs +++ b/src/api/signature/payload.rs @@ -35,15 +35,18 @@ pub type QueryMap = HashMap<String, String>; pub async fn check_payload_signature( garage: &Garage, - service: &'static str, request: &mut Request<IncomingBody>, + service: &'static str, ) -> Result<(Option<Key>, Option<Hash>), Error> { let query = parse_query_map(request.uri())?; - if request.headers().contains_key(AUTHORIZATION) { - check_standard_signature(garage, service, request, query).await - } else if query.contains_key(X_AMZ_ALGORITHM.as_str()) { + if query.contains_key(X_AMZ_ALGORITHM.as_str()) { + // We check for presigned-URL-style authentification first, because + // the browser or someting else could inject an Authorization header + // that is totally unrelated to AWS signatures. check_presigned_signature(garage, service, request, query).await + } else if request.headers().contains_key(AUTHORIZATION) { + check_standard_signature(garage, service, request, query).await } else { // Unsigned (anonymous) request let content_sha256 = request @@ -68,27 +71,15 @@ async fn check_standard_signature( request: &Request<IncomingBody>, query: QueryMap, ) -> Result<(Option<Key>, Option<Hash>), Error> { - let authorization = Authorization::parse(request.headers())?; + let authorization = Authorization::parse_header(request.headers())?; // Verify that all necessary request headers are included in signed_headers - // For standard AWSv4 signatures, the following must be incldued: - // - the Host header (in all cases) + // For standard AWSv4 signatures, the following must be included: + // - the Host header (mandatory) // - the Content-Type header, if it is used in the request // - all x-amz-* headers used in the request let signed_headers = split_signed_headers(&authorization)?; - if !signed_headers.contains(&HOST) { - return Err(Error::bad_request("Header `Host` should be signed")); - } - for (name, _) in request.headers().iter() { - if name == CONTENT_TYPE || name.as_str().starts_with("x-amz-") { - if !signed_headers.contains(name) { - return Err(Error::bad_request(format!( - "Header `{}` should be signed", - name - ))); - } - } - } + verify_signed_headers(request.headers(), &signed_headers, &[CONTENT_TYPE])?; let canonical_request = canonical_request( service, @@ -135,22 +126,10 @@ async fn check_presigned_signature( // Verify that all necessary request headers are included in signed_headers // For AWSv4 pre-signed URLs, the following must be incldued: - // - the Host header (in all cases) + // - the Host header (mandatory) // - all x-amz-* headers used in the request let signed_headers = split_signed_headers(&authorization)?; - if !signed_headers.contains(&HOST) { - return Err(Error::bad_request("Header `Host` should be signed")); - } - for (name, _) in request.headers().iter() { - if name.as_str().starts_with("x-amz-") { - if !signed_headers.contains(name) { - return Err(Error::bad_request(format!( - "Header `{}` should be signed", - name - ))); - } - } - } + verify_signed_headers(request.headers(), &signed_headers, &[])?; // The X-Amz-Signature value is passed as a query parameter, // but the signature cannot be computed from a string that contains itself. @@ -172,13 +151,14 @@ async fn check_presigned_signature( &canonical_request, ); - trace!("canonical request:\n{}", canonical_request); - trace!("string to sign:\n{}", string_to_sign); + trace!("canonical request (presigned url):\n{}", canonical_request); + trace!("string to sign (presigned url):\n{}", string_to_sign); let key = verify_v4(garage, service, &authorization, string_to_sign.as_bytes()).await?; - // AWS specifies that if a signed query parameter and a signed header of the same name - // have different values, then an InvalidRequest error is raised. + // In the page on presigned URLs, AWS specifies that if a signed query + // parameter and a signed header of the same name have different values, + // then an InvalidRequest error is raised. let headers_mut = request.headers_mut(); for (name, value) in query.iter() { let name = @@ -197,7 +177,7 @@ async fn check_presigned_signature( // What we do is just add them to the Request object as regular headers, // that will be handled downstream as if they were included like in a normal request. // (Here we allow such query parameters to override headers with the same name - // if they are not signed, however there is not much reason that this would happen) + // that are not signed, however there is not much reason that this would happen) headers_mut.insert( name, HeaderValue::from_bytes(value.as_bytes()) @@ -206,6 +186,8 @@ async fn check_presigned_signature( } } + // Presigned URLs always use UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD, + // so there is no sha256 hash to return. Ok((Some(key), None)) } @@ -225,6 +207,17 @@ pub fn parse_query_map(uri: &http::uri::Uri) -> Result<QueryMap, Error> { Ok(query) } +fn parse_credential(cred: &str) -> Result<(String, String), Error> { + let first_slash = cred + .find('/') + .ok_or_bad_request("Credentials does not contain '/' in authorization field")?; + let (key_id, scope) = cred.split_at(first_slash); + Ok(( + key_id.to_string(), + scope.trim_start_matches('/').to_string(), + )) +} + fn split_signed_headers(authorization: &Authorization) -> Result<Vec<HeaderName>, Error> { let mut signed_headers = authorization .signed_headers @@ -236,6 +229,27 @@ fn split_signed_headers(authorization: &Authorization) -> Result<Vec<HeaderName> Ok(signed_headers) } +fn verify_signed_headers( + headers: &HeaderMap, + signed_headers: &[HeaderName], + extra_headers: &[HeaderName], +) -> Result<(), Error> { + if !signed_headers.contains(&HOST) { + return Err(Error::bad_request("Header `Host` should be signed")); + } + for (name, _) in headers.iter() { + if name.as_str().starts_with("x-amz-") || extra_headers.contains(name) { + if !signed_headers.contains(name) { + return Err(Error::bad_request(format!( + "Header `{}` should be signed", + name + ))); + } + } + } + Ok(()) +} + pub fn string_to_sign(datetime: &DateTime<Utc>, scope_string: &str, canonical_req: &str) -> String { let mut hasher = Sha256::default(); hasher.update(canonical_req.as_bytes()); @@ -381,7 +395,7 @@ pub struct Authorization { } impl Authorization { - fn parse(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<Self, Error> { + fn parse_header(headers: &HeaderMap) -> Result<Self, Error> { let authorization = headers .get(AUTHORIZATION) .ok_or_bad_request("Missing authorization header")? @@ -535,14 +549,3 @@ impl Authorization { Ok(auth) } } - -fn parse_credential(cred: &str) -> Result<(String, String), Error> { - let first_slash = cred - .find('/') - .ok_or_bad_request("Credentials does not contain '/' in authorization field")?; - let (key_id, scope) = cred.split_at(first_slash); - Ok(( - key_id.to_string(), - scope.trim_start_matches('/').to_string(), - )) -} |