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Diffstat (limited to 'src/auth.rs')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/auth.rs | 855 |
1 files changed, 855 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/auth.rs b/src/auth.rs new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3edcbc --- /dev/null +++ b/src/auth.rs @@ -0,0 +1,855 @@ +use std::net::SocketAddr; + +use anyhow::{Result, anyhow, bail}; +use futures::stream::{FuturesUnordered, StreamExt}; +use tokio::io::BufStream; +use tokio::io::{AsyncBufReadExt, AsyncWriteExt}; +use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream}; +use tokio::sync::watch; + +use crate::config::AuthConfig; +use crate::login::ArcLoginProvider; + +/// Seek compatibility with the Dovecot Authentication Protocol +/// +/// ## Trace +/// +/// ```text +/// S: VERSION 1 2 +/// S: MECH PLAIN plaintext +/// S: MECH LOGIN plaintext +/// S: SPID 15 +/// S: CUID 17654 +/// S: COOKIE f56692bee41f471ed01bd83520025305 +/// S: DONE +/// C: VERSION 1 2 +/// C: CPID 1 +/// +/// C: AUTH 2 PLAIN service=smtp +/// S: CONT 2 +/// C: CONT 2 base64stringFollowingRFC4616== +/// S: OK 2 user=alice@example.tld +/// +/// C: AUTH 42 LOGIN service=smtp +/// S: CONT 42 VXNlcm5hbWU6 +/// C: CONT 42 b64User +/// S: CONT 42 UGFzc3dvcmQ6 +/// C: CONT 42 b64Pass +/// S: FAIL 42 user=alice +/// ``` +/// +/// ## RFC References +/// +/// PLAIN SASL - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc4616 +/// +/// +/// ## Dovecot References +/// +/// https://doc.dovecot.org/developer_manual/design/auth_protocol/ +/// https://doc.dovecot.org/configuration_manual/authentication/authentication_mechanisms/#authentication-authentication-mechanisms +/// https://doc.dovecot.org/configuration_manual/howto/simple_virtual_install/#simple-virtual-install-smtp-auth +/// https://doc.dovecot.org/configuration_manual/howto/postfix_and_dovecot_sasl/#howto-postfix-and-dovecot-sasl +pub struct AuthServer { + login_provider: ArcLoginProvider, + bind_addr: SocketAddr, +} + + +impl AuthServer { + pub fn new( + config: AuthConfig, + login_provider: ArcLoginProvider, + ) -> Self { + Self { + bind_addr: config.bind_addr, + login_provider, + } + } + + + pub async fn run(self: Self, mut must_exit: watch::Receiver<bool>) -> Result<()> { + let tcp = TcpListener::bind(self.bind_addr).await?; + tracing::info!("SASL Authentication Protocol listening on {:#}", self.bind_addr); + + let mut connections = FuturesUnordered::new(); + + while !*must_exit.borrow() { + let wait_conn_finished = async { + if connections.is_empty() { + futures::future::pending().await + } else { + connections.next().await + } + }; + + let (socket, remote_addr) = tokio::select! { + a = tcp.accept() => a?, + _ = wait_conn_finished => continue, + _ = must_exit.changed() => continue, + }; + + tracing::info!("AUTH: accepted connection from {}", remote_addr); + let conn = tokio::spawn(NetLoop::new(socket, self.login_provider.clone(), must_exit.clone()).run_error()); + + + connections.push(conn); + } + drop(tcp); + + tracing::info!("AUTH server shutting down, draining remaining connections..."); + while connections.next().await.is_some() {} + + Ok(()) + } +} + +struct NetLoop { + login: ArcLoginProvider, + stream: BufStream<TcpStream>, + stop: watch::Receiver<bool>, + state: State, + read_buf: Vec<u8>, + write_buf: BytesMut, +} + +impl NetLoop { + fn new(stream: TcpStream, login: ArcLoginProvider, stop: watch::Receiver<bool>) -> Self { + Self { + login, + stream: BufStream::new(stream), + state: State::Init, + stop, + read_buf: Vec::new(), + write_buf: BytesMut::new(), + } + } + + async fn run_error(self) { + match self.run().await { + Ok(()) => tracing::info!("Auth session succeeded"), + Err(e) => tracing::error!(err=?e, "Auth session failed"), + } + } + + async fn run(mut self) -> Result<()> { + loop { + tokio::select! { + read_res = self.stream.read_until(b'\n', &mut self.read_buf) => { + // Detect EOF / socket close + let bread = read_res?; + if bread == 0 { + tracing::info!("Reading buffer empty, connection has been closed. Exiting AUTH session."); + return Ok(()) + } + + // Parse command + let (_, cmd) = client_command(&self.read_buf).map_err(|_| anyhow!("Unable to parse command"))?; + tracing::trace!(cmd=?cmd, "Received command"); + + // Make some progress in our local state + self.state.progress(cmd, &self.login).await; + if matches!(self.state, State::Error) { + bail!("Internal state is in error, previous logs explain what went wrong"); + } + + // Build response + let srv_cmds = self.state.response(); + srv_cmds.iter().try_for_each(|r| { + tracing::trace!(cmd=?r, "Sent command"); + r.encode(&mut self.write_buf) + })?; + + // Send responses if at least one command response has been generated + if !srv_cmds.is_empty() { + self.stream.write_all(&self.write_buf).await?; + self.stream.flush().await?; + } + + // Reset buffers + self.read_buf.clear(); + self.write_buf.clear(); + }, + _ = self.stop.changed() => { + tracing::debug!("Server is stopping, quitting this runner"); + return Ok(()) + } + } + } + } +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// BUSINESS LOGIC +// +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- +use rand::prelude::*; + +#[derive(Debug)] +enum AuthRes { + Success(String), + Failed(Option<String>, Option<FailCode>), +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +enum State { + Error, + Init, + HandshakePart(Version), + HandshakeDone, + AuthPlainProgress { + id: u64, + }, + AuthDone { + id: u64, + res: AuthRes + }, +} + +const SERVER_MAJOR: u64 = 1; +const SERVER_MINOR: u64 = 2; +impl State { + async fn progress(&mut self, cmd: ClientCommand, login: &ArcLoginProvider) { + + let new_state = 'state: { + match (std::mem::replace(self, State::Error), cmd) { + (Self::Init, ClientCommand::Version(v)) => Self::HandshakePart(v), + (Self::HandshakePart(version), ClientCommand::Cpid(_cpid)) => { + if version.major != SERVER_MAJOR { + tracing::error!(client_major=version.major, server_major=SERVER_MAJOR, "Unsupported client major version"); + break 'state Self::Error + } + + Self::HandshakeDone + }, + (Self::HandshakeDone { .. }, ClientCommand::Auth { id, mech, .. }) | + (Self::AuthDone { .. }, ClientCommand::Auth { id, mech, ..}) => { + if mech != Mechanism::Plain { + tracing::error!(mechanism=?mech, "Unsupported Authentication Mechanism"); + break 'state Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Failed(None, None) } + } + + Self::AuthPlainProgress { id } + }, + (Self::AuthPlainProgress { id }, ClientCommand::Cont { id: cid, data }) => { + // Check that ID matches + if cid != id { + tracing::error!(auth_id=id, cont_id=cid, "CONT id does not match AUTH id"); + break 'state Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Failed(None, None) } + } + + // Check that we can extract user's login+pass + let (ubin, pbin) = match auth_plain(&data) { + Ok(([], ([], user, pass))) => (user, pass), + Ok(_) => { + tracing::error!("Impersonating user is not supported"); + break 'state Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Failed(None, None) } + } + Err(e) => { + tracing::error!(err=?e, "Could not parse the SASL PLAIN data chunk"); + break 'state Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Failed(None, None) } + }, + }; + + // Try to convert it to UTF-8 + let (user, password) = match (std::str::from_utf8(ubin), std::str::from_utf8(pbin)) { + (Ok(u), Ok(p)) => (u, p), + _ => { + tracing::error!("Username or password contain invalid UTF-8 characters"); + break 'state Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Failed(None, None) } + } + }; + + // Try to connect user + match login.login(user, password).await { + Ok(_) => Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Success(user.to_string())}, + Err(e) => { + tracing::warn!(err=?e, "login failed"); + Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Failed(Some(user.to_string()), None) } + } + } + }, + _ => { + tracing::error!("This command is not valid in this context"); + Self::Error + }, + } + }; + tracing::debug!(state=?new_state, "Made progress"); + *self = new_state; + } + + fn response(&self) -> Vec<ServerCommand> { + let mut srv_cmd: Vec<ServerCommand> = Vec::new(); + + match self { + Self::HandshakeDone { .. } => { + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Version(Version { major: SERVER_MAJOR, minor: SERVER_MINOR })); + + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Mech { + kind: Mechanism::Plain, + parameters: vec![MechanismParameters::PlainText], + }); + + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Spid(15u64)); + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Cuid(19350u64)); + + let mut cookie = [0u8; 16]; + thread_rng().fill(&mut cookie); + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Cookie(cookie)); + + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Done); + }, + Self::AuthPlainProgress { id } => { + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Cont { id: *id, data: None }); + }, + Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Success(user) } => { + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Ok { id: *id, user_id: Some(user.to_string()), extra_parameters: vec![]}); + }, + Self::AuthDone { id, res: AuthRes::Failed(maybe_user, maybe_failcode) } => { + srv_cmd.push(ServerCommand::Fail { id: *id, user_id: maybe_user.clone(), code: maybe_failcode.clone(), extra_parameters: vec![]}); + }, + _ => (), + }; + + srv_cmd + } +} + + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// DOVECOT AUTH TYPES +// +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- + +#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)] +enum Mechanism { + Plain, + Login, +} + + +#[derive(Clone, Debug)] +enum AuthOption { + /// Unique session ID. Mainly used for logging. + Session(u64), + /// Local IP connected to by the client. In standard string format, e.g. 127.0.0.1 or ::1. + LocalIp(String), + /// Remote client IP + RemoteIp(String), + /// Local port connected to by the client. + LocalPort(u16), + /// Remote client port + RemotePort(u16), + /// When Dovecot proxy is used, the real_rip/real_port are the proxy’s IP/port and real_lip/real_lport are the backend’s IP/port where the proxy was connected to. + RealRemoteIp(String), + RealLocalIp(String), + RealLocalPort(u16), + RealRemotePort(u16), + /// TLS SNI name + LocalName(String), + /// Enable debugging for this lookup. + Debug, + /// List of fields that will become available via %{forward_*} variables. The list is double-tab-escaped, like: tab_escaped[tab_escaped(key=value)[<TAB>...] + /// Note: we do not unescape the tabulation, and thus we don't parse the data + ForwardViews(Vec<u8>), + /// Remote user has secured transport to auth client (e.g. localhost, SSL, TLS). + Secured(Option<String>), + /// The value can be “insecure”, “trusted” or “TLS”. + Transport(String), + /// TLS cipher being used. + TlsCipher(String), + /// The number of bits in the TLS cipher. + /// @FIXME: I don't know how if it's a string or an integer + TlsCipherBits(String), + /// TLS perfect forward secrecy algorithm (e.g. DH, ECDH) + TlsPfs(String), + /// TLS protocol name (e.g. SSLv3, TLSv1.2) + TlsProtocol(String), + /// Remote user has presented a valid SSL certificate. + ValidClientCert(String), + /// Ignore auth penalty tracking for this request + NoPenalty, + /// Unknown option sent by Postfix + NoLogin, + /// Username taken from client’s SSL certificate. + CertUsername, + /// IMAP ID string + ClientId, + /// An unknown key + UnknownPair(String, Vec<u8>), + UnknownBool(Vec<u8>), + /// Initial response for authentication mechanism. + /// NOTE: This must be the last parameter. Everything after it is ignored. + /// This is to avoid accidental security holes if user-given data is directly put to base64 string without filtering out tabs. + /// @FIXME: I don't understand this parameter + Resp(Vec<u8>), +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +struct Version { + major: u64, + minor: u64, +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +enum ClientCommand { + /// Both client and server should check that they support the same major version number. If they don’t, the other side isn’t expected to be talking the same protocol and should be disconnected. Minor version can be ignored. This document specifies the version number 1.2. + Version(Version), + /// CPID finishes the handshake from client. + Cpid(u64), + Auth { + /// ID is a connection-specific unique request identifier. It must be a 32bit number, so typically you’d just increment it by one. + id: u64, + /// A SASL mechanism (eg. LOGIN, PLAIN, etc.) + /// See: https://doc.dovecot.org/configuration_manual/authentication/authentication_mechanisms/#authentication-authentication-mechanisms + mech: Mechanism, + /// Service is the service requesting authentication, eg. pop3, imap, smtp. + service: String, + /// All the optional parameters + options: Vec<AuthOption>, + + }, + Cont { + /// The <id> must match the <id> of the AUTH command. + id: u64, + /// Data that will be serialized to / deserialized from base64 + data: Vec<u8>, + } +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +enum MechanismParameters { + /// Anonymous authentication + Anonymous, + /// Transfers plaintext passwords + PlainText, + /// Subject to passive (dictionary) attack + Dictionary, + /// Subject to active (non-dictionary) attack + Active, + /// Provides forward secrecy between sessions + ForwardSecrecy, + /// Provides mutual authentication + MutualAuth, + /// Don’t advertise this as available SASL mechanism (eg. APOP) + Private, +} + +#[derive(Debug, Clone)] +enum FailCode { + /// This is a temporary internal failure, e.g. connection was lost to SQL database. + TempFail, + /// Authentication succeeded, but authorization failed (master user’s password was ok, but destination user was not ok). + AuthzFail, + /// User is disabled (password may or may not have been correct) + UserDisabled, + /// User’s password has expired. + PassExpired, +} + +#[derive(Debug)] +enum ServerCommand { + /// Both client and server should check that they support the same major version number. If they don’t, the other side isn’t expected to be talking the same protocol and should be disconnected. Minor version can be ignored. This document specifies the version number 1.2. + Version(Version), + /// CPID and SPID specify client and server Process Identifiers (PIDs). They should be unique identifiers for the specific process. UNIX process IDs are good choices. + /// SPID can be used by authentication client to tell master which server process handled the authentication. + Spid(u64), + /// CUID is a server process-specific unique connection identifier. It’s different each time a connection is established for the server. + /// CUID is currently useful only for APOP authentication. + Cuid(u64), + Mech { + kind: Mechanism, + parameters: Vec<MechanismParameters>, + }, + /// COOKIE returns connection-specific 128 bit cookie in hex. It must be given to REQUEST command. (Protocol v1.1+ / Dovecot v2.0+) + Cookie([u8;16]), + /// DONE finishes the handshake from server. + Done, + + Fail { + id: u64, + user_id: Option<String>, + code: Option<FailCode>, + extra_parameters: Vec<Vec<u8>>, + }, + Cont { + id: u64, + data: Option<Vec<u8>>, + }, + /// FAIL and OK may contain multiple unspecified parameters which authentication client may handle specially. + /// The only one specified here is user=<userid> parameter, which should always be sent if the userid is known. + Ok { + id: u64, + user_id: Option<String>, + extra_parameters: Vec<Vec<u8>>, + }, +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// DOVECOT AUTH DECODING +// +// ------------------------------------------------------------------ + +use nom::{ + IResult, + branch::alt, + error::{ErrorKind, Error}, + character::complete::{tab, u64, u16}, + bytes::complete::{is_not, tag, tag_no_case, take, take_while, take_while1}, + multi::{many1, separated_list0}, + combinator::{map, opt, recognize, value, rest}, + sequence::{pair, preceded, tuple}, +}; +use base64::Engine; + +fn version_command<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], ClientCommand> { + let mut parser = tuple(( + tag_no_case(b"VERSION"), + tab, + u64, + tab, + u64 + )); + + let (input, (_, _, major, _, minor)) = parser(input)?; + Ok((input, ClientCommand::Version(Version { major, minor }))) +} + +fn cpid_command<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], ClientCommand> { + preceded( + pair(tag_no_case(b"CPID"), tab), + map(u64, |v| ClientCommand::Cpid(v)) + )(input) +} + +fn mechanism<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], Mechanism> { + alt(( + value(Mechanism::Plain, tag_no_case(b"PLAIN")), + value(Mechanism::Login, tag_no_case(b"LOGIN")), + ))(input) +} + +fn is_not_tab_or_esc_or_lf(c: u8) -> bool { + c != 0x09 && c != 0x01 && c != 0x0a // TAB or 0x01 or LF +} + +fn is_esc<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], &[u8]> { + preceded(tag(&[0x01]), take(1usize))(input) +} + +fn parameter<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], &[u8]> { + recognize(many1(alt(( + take_while1(is_not_tab_or_esc_or_lf), + is_esc + ))))(input) +} + +fn parameter_str(input: &[u8]) -> IResult<&[u8], String> { + let (input, buf) = parameter(input)?; + + std::str::from_utf8(buf) + .map(|v| (input, v.to_string())) + .map_err(|_| nom::Err::Failure(Error::new(input, ErrorKind::TakeWhile1))) +} + +fn is_param_name_char(c: u8) -> bool { + is_not_tab_or_esc_or_lf(c) && c != 0x3d // = +} + +fn parameter_name(input: &[u8]) -> IResult<&[u8], String> { + let (input, buf) = take_while1(is_param_name_char)(input)?; + + std::str::from_utf8(buf) + .map(|v| (input, v.to_string())) + .map_err(|_| nom::Err::Failure(Error::new(input, ErrorKind::TakeWhile1))) +} + +fn service<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], String> { + preceded( + tag_no_case("service="), + parameter_str + )(input) +} + +fn auth_option<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], AuthOption> { + use AuthOption::*; + alt(( + alt(( + value(Debug, tag_no_case(b"debug")), + value(NoPenalty, tag_no_case(b"no-penalty")), + value(ClientId, tag_no_case(b"client_id")), + value(NoLogin, tag_no_case(b"nologin")), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"session="), u64), |id| Session(id)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"lip="), parameter_str), |ip| LocalIp(ip)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"rip="), parameter_str), |ip| RemoteIp(ip)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"lport="), u16), |port| LocalPort(port)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"rport="), u16), |port| RemotePort(port)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"real_rip="), parameter_str), |ip| RealRemoteIp(ip)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"real_lip="), parameter_str), |ip| RealLocalIp(ip)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"real_lport="), u16), |port| RealLocalPort(port)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"real_rport="), u16), |port| RealRemotePort(port)), + )), + alt(( + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"local_name="), parameter_str), |name| LocalName(name)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"forward_views="), parameter), |views| ForwardViews(views.into())), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"secured="), parameter_str), |info| Secured(Some(info))), + value(Secured(None), tag_no_case(b"secured")), + value(CertUsername, tag_no_case(b"cert_username")), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"transport="), parameter_str), |ts| Transport(ts)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"tls_cipher="), parameter_str), |cipher| TlsCipher(cipher)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"tls_cipher_bits="), parameter_str), |bits| TlsCipherBits(bits)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"tls_pfs="), parameter_str), |pfs| TlsPfs(pfs)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"tls_protocol="), parameter_str), |proto| TlsProtocol(proto)), + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"valid-client-cert="), parameter_str), |cert| ValidClientCert(cert)), + )), + alt(( + map(preceded(tag_no_case(b"resp="), base64), |data| Resp(data)), + map(tuple((parameter_name, tag(b"="), parameter)), |(n, _, v)| UnknownPair(n, v.into())), + map(parameter, |v| UnknownBool(v.into())), + )), + ))(input) +} + +fn auth_command<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], ClientCommand> { + let mut parser = tuple(( + tag_no_case(b"AUTH"), + tab, + u64, + tab, + mechanism, + tab, + service, + map( + opt(preceded(tab, separated_list0(tab, auth_option))), + |o| o.unwrap_or(vec![]) + ), + )); + let (input, (_, _, id, _, mech, _, service, options)) = parser(input)?; + Ok((input, ClientCommand::Auth { id, mech, service, options })) +} + +fn is_base64_core(c: u8) -> bool { + c >= 0x30 && c <= 0x39 // 0-9 + || c >= 0x41 && c <= 0x5a // A-Z + || c >= 0x61 && c <= 0x7a // a-z + || c == 0x2b // + + || c == 0x2f // / +} + +fn is_base64_pad(c: u8) -> bool { + c == 0x3d // = +} + +fn base64(input: &[u8]) -> IResult<&[u8], Vec<u8>> { + let (input, (b64, _)) = tuple(( + take_while1(is_base64_core), + take_while(is_base64_pad), + ))(input)?; + + let data = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD_NO_PAD + .decode(b64) + .map_err(|_| nom::Err::Failure(Error::new(input, ErrorKind::TakeWhile1)))?; + + Ok((input, data)) +} + +/// @FIXME Dovecot does not say if base64 content must be padded or not +fn cont_command<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], ClientCommand> { + let mut parser = tuple(( + tag_no_case(b"CONT"), + tab, + u64, + tab, + base64 + )); + + let (input, (_, _, id, _, data)) = parser(input)?; + Ok((input, ClientCommand::Cont { id, data })) +} + +fn client_command<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], ClientCommand> { + alt(( + version_command, + cpid_command, + auth_command, + cont_command, + ))(input) +} + +/* +fn server_command(buf: &u8) -> IResult<&u8, ServerCommand> { + unimplemented!(); +} +*/ + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// SASL DECODING +// +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- + +fn not_null(c: u8) -> bool { + c != 0x0 +} + +// impersonated user, login, password +fn auth_plain<'a>(input: &'a [u8]) -> IResult<&'a [u8], (&'a [u8], &'a [u8], &'a [u8])> { + map( + tuple((take_while(not_null), take(1usize), take_while(not_null), take(1usize), rest)), + |(imp, _, user, _, pass)| (imp, user, pass), + )(input) +} + +// ----------------------------------------------------------------- +// +// DOVECOT AUTH ENCODING +// +// ------------------------------------------------------------------ +use tokio_util::bytes::{BufMut, BytesMut}; +trait Encode { + fn encode(&self, out: &mut BytesMut) -> Result<()>; +} + +fn tab_enc(out: &mut BytesMut) { + out.put(&[0x09][..]) +} + +fn lf_enc(out: &mut BytesMut) { + out.put(&[0x0A][..]) +} + +impl Encode for Mechanism { + fn encode(&self, out: &mut BytesMut) -> Result<()> { + match self { + Self::Plain => out.put(&b"PLAIN"[..]), + Self::Login => out.put(&b"LOGIN"[..]), + } + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl Encode for MechanismParameters { + fn encode(&self, out: &mut BytesMut) -> Result<()> { + match self { + Self::Anonymous => out.put(&b"anonymous"[..]), + Self::PlainText => out.put(&b"plaintext"[..]), + Self::Dictionary => out.put(&b"dictionary"[..]), + Self::Active => out.put(&b"active"[..]), + Self::ForwardSecrecy => out.put(&b"forward-secrecy"[..]), + Self::MutualAuth => out.put(&b"mutual-auth"[..]), + Self::Private => out.put(&b"private"[..]), + } + Ok(()) + } +} + + +impl Encode for FailCode { + fn encode(&self, out: &mut BytesMut) -> Result<()> { + match self { + Self::TempFail => out.put(&b"temp_fail"[..]), + Self::AuthzFail => out.put(&b"authz_fail"[..]), + Self::UserDisabled => out.put(&b"user_disabled"[..]), + Self::PassExpired => out.put(&b"pass_expired"[..]), + }; + Ok(()) + } +} + +impl Encode for ServerCommand { + fn encode(&self, out: &mut BytesMut) -> Result<()> { + match self { + Self::Version (Version { major, minor }) => { + out.put(&b"VERSION"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(major.to_string().as_bytes()); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(minor.to_string().as_bytes()); + lf_enc(out); + }, + Self::Spid(pid) => { + out.put(&b"SPID"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(pid.to_string().as_bytes()); + lf_enc(out); + }, + Self::Cuid(pid) => { + out.put(&b"CUID"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(pid.to_string().as_bytes()); + lf_enc(out); + }, + Self::Cookie(cval) => { + out.put(&b"COOKIE"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(hex::encode(cval).as_bytes()); + lf_enc(out); + + }, + Self::Mech { kind, parameters } => { + out.put(&b"MECH"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + kind.encode(out)?; + for p in parameters.iter() { + tab_enc(out); + p.encode(out)?; + } + lf_enc(out); + }, + Self::Done => { + out.put(&b"DONE"[..]); + lf_enc(out); + }, + Self::Cont { id, data } => { + out.put(&b"CONT"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(id.to_string().as_bytes()); + tab_enc(out); + if let Some(rdata) = data { + let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(rdata); + out.put(b64.as_bytes()); + } + lf_enc(out); + }, + Self::Ok { id, user_id, extra_parameters } => { + out.put(&b"OK"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(id.to_string().as_bytes()); + if let Some(user) = user_id { + tab_enc(out); + out.put(&b"user="[..]); + out.put(user.as_bytes()); + } + for p in extra_parameters.iter() { + tab_enc(out); + out.put(&p[..]); + } + lf_enc(out); + }, + Self::Fail {id, user_id, code, extra_parameters } => { + out.put(&b"FAIL"[..]); + tab_enc(out); + out.put(id.to_string().as_bytes()); + if let Some(user) = user_id { + tab_enc(out); + out.put(&b"user="[..]); + out.put(user.as_bytes()); + } + if let Some(code_val) = code { + tab_enc(out); + out.put(&b"code="[..]); + code_val.encode(out)?; + } + for p in extra_parameters.iter() { + tab_enc(out); + out.put(&p[..]); + } + lf_enc(out); + }, + } + Ok(()) + } +} |